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DEAD SOLDIERS AND THEIR POSTHUMOUSLY 
CONCEIVED CHILDREN 
                    Charles P. Kindregan, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The potential for conceiving a child in vitro through the use of 
cryopreserved gametes of a deceased person, or those of a person who has 
become incompetent, raises many legal concerns.  A decision to harvest 
sperm or eggs from a deceased or incompetent person and use the harvested 
gametes to produce a child has implications for inheritance, estate planning, 
will drafting, trusts, social security claims, child support responsibility, and 
custody issues.  This article focuses on the issues arising from the 
posthumous use of reproductive material to produce a child in the context of 
the use of cryopreservation by members of the military.  Although 
individuals on active duty in the military make up only one half of one 
percent of the general population of the United States,1 a solution to the 
problems created by posthumous conception of children in the military may 
have many ramifications for civilians as well.2  For example, a civilian may 
cryopreserve his or her gametes before undergoing aggressive cancer 
treatment in the hope that the person will still have the ability to conceive a 
genetically connected child whether they survive the treatment or not.3 
Civilians have also requested the removal of the sperm or eggs of an injured 
 
 * Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., is a Professor of Law at Suffolk University where he teaches 
courses in Family Law, Financial Issues in Family Law, and the Law of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology.  He graduated from Chicago-Kent College of Law (J.D.) and 
Northwestern University Law School (L.L.M.).  He co-authored the American Bar 
Association book on ASSISTED  REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S’ GUIDE TO 
THE EMERGING LAW & SCIENCE (2d ed. 2011) with Adjunct Professor Maureen McBrien 
of the firm Brick and Sugarman in Cambridge, Massachusetts.  Professor Kindregan also 
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 1. Donna Miles, Survey Shows Growing Gap Between Civilians, Military, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF. (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx? 
ID=66253. 
 2. See generally Charles P. Kindregan, Genetically Related Children: Harvesting of 
Gametes from Deceased or Incompetent Persons, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW 147 
(2011) (giving various examples of harvesting of gametes from dead or incompetent 
persons). 
 3. Id. at 162-64. 
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or recently killed person and the use of such cryopreserved materials to 
produce a pregnancy.4  In the civilian context, posthumous conception of 
children may be sought for many different reasons: providing tribute to the 
deceased loved one, producing a sibling for a previously born child, or 
reducing the cost of conceiving a child using donor gametes provided by a 
clinic.5  The military context provides a useful opportunity to explore 
posthumous conception, including issues of consent, rights of survivors, and 
access to public benefits that depend on a child’s relationship to the 
deceased or incompetent genetic parent. 
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION 
When a service-member is killed or rendered incompetent in combat or in 
an accident, it may be assumed that this prevents the service-member from 
parenting a genetically connected child.  The same is true of a service- 
member who suffers a severe injury that harms the service-member’s 
reproductive organs and renders them infertile.  These assumptions, 
however, are not necessarily true.  Contemporary medical procedures using 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) 6 have made it possible for dead 
or incompetent individuals to conceive genetically related children even 
after death or serious injury.7  This is done by retrieving and cryopreserving 
gametes8 or embryos9 produced to be used for in vitro fertilization.10  The 
 
 4. Id. at 156-58. 
 5. Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation has 
Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address it Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix It, 
21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 347, 358-59 (2011) (noting various reasons people may 
seek to conceive a child posthumously). 
 6. Assisted Reproductive Technology [hereinafter “ART”] means “medical or 
scientific intervention . . . for the purpose of achieving live birth that results from assisted 
conception.” MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(2) (2008) 
[hereinafter “A.B.A. MODEL ACT”]. 
 7. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 147-48. 
 8. Retrieval of gametes is also sometimes called “harvesting.”  Id. at 149 n.12.  
Gametes are sperm or eggs.  A.B.A. MODEL ACT § 102(13).  Cryopreservation of sperm 
is a technology which has been used for at least a half century.  See Carpenter, supra note 
6, at 349 (noting that the first successful pregnancy using frozen sperm occurred in 1953). 
Preservation of unfertilized eggs developed much more slowly than cryopreservation of 
sperm, but appears to be more common today.  See also Mitch Leslie, Melting Opposition 
to Frozen Eggs, 316 SCIENCE 388, 388-89 (2007) (noting development of technologies 
for freezing and thawing of eggs). 
 9. Embryos are fertilized eggs that can be preserved after in vitro fertilization.  See 
Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal 
Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169, 170-71 
(2004) (survey of various legal issues created by the preservation of hundreds of 
thousands of embryos). 
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gametes or embryos can later be used to cause a pregnancy and birth of a 
child who is genetically related to the incompetent or deceased person.11  
The potential legal issues may not be initially evident, but issues arising 
from consent standards for harvesting and using gametes and embryos can 
take place both in the context of military service and in civilian life.12 
III. DO DEAD PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO REPRODUCE? 
Posing the question about posthumous reproduction in terms of a deceased 
person’s right to reproduce may be inappropriate since after death, a person 
essentially has no enforceable legal rights.13  Nevertheless, our legal system 
does recognize the right of a living person to plan for events after his or her 
death by execution of a will or creation of a testamentary trust to impose 
duties on his or her estate.14  A person cannot force others to use his or her 
gametes to conceive the deceased’s child after death; however, a person can 
cryopreserve his or her gametes, allowing a spouse or loved one to have the 
choice of using them.15  In such a circumstance, the donor can even limit 
this choice to persons he or she designates as entitled to make the decision 
for him or her.16  A person can also affect the posthumous decision to 
harvest his sperm or her eggs by consenting to this in a record, which also 
details how and by whom the harvested gametes are to be used after his or 
her death.17  For example, individuals about to undergo chemotherapy, 
which will negatively affect their fertility, sometimes choose to store 
gametes in case he or she dies or is rendered infertile.18  In the United States, 
there is currently no statutory restraint or prohibition on gamete retrieval or 
storage.19 
 
 10. A.B.A. MODEL ACT § 102(20) (defining in vitro as “the formation of a human 
embryo outside the human body”). 
 11. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 
39 FAM. L.Q. 579, 579 (2005); Vardit Ravitsky, Posthumous Reproduction Guidelines in 
Israel, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 6, 6 (2004); Bruce A. Fowler & Teresa C. Baird, Frozen 
in Time: An Analysis of Postmortem Insemination, Planning for the Posthumously 
Conceived Children, 37 COLO. LAW. 45, 45 (2008); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Dead 
Dads: Thawing an Heir from the Freezer, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433, 434 (2009). 
 12. See Kindregan, supra note 3, at 160-61. 
 13. Kirsten R. Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 763 (2009). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 148. 
 16. Id. at 152. 
 17. Id. at 150. 
 18. Id. at 162-64. 
 19. Id. at 153. 
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There is some doubt whether there is a protected fundamental right to 
procreate.20  After the 1949 Revolution, China enacted a policy of 
population limitation by restricting the right of women to give birth to more 
than one child.21  Such a government program in the United States would be 
met with strong constitutional objection.22  While the Supreme Court of the 
United States previously held that a state may forcibly deprive a person of 
the ability to reproduce by compulsory sterilization based on eugenic 
factors,23 state compulsory sterilization laws are rarely, if ever, enforced 
today.24  Now, states have instead turned to specifically prohibiting the use 
of cloning as a means of conceiving human children.25  While there is some 
doubt about the extent of the legally protected right to procreate, there is 
substantial dictum suggesting that there is a basis for protecting the 
individual’s right to reproduce as well-founded in American constitutional 
law:26 “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual 
married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
 
 20. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., State Power Over Human Fertility and Individual 
Liberty, 23 HASTINGS LAW J. 1401, 1407-08 (1972) (quoting In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 
171, 174-75 (Neb. 1968)) (analyzing the Supreme Court of Nebraska’s discussion of a 
right “to bear and . . . beget children” that can be limited by the state). 
 21. Xizhe Peng, Population Policy and Pregnancy in China: Challenge and 
Prospectives, 35 TEXAS INT’L L. J. 51, 52-53 (2000). 
 22. See Kindregan, supra note 21, at 1402 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg J., concurring)). 
 23. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding the power of a state to 
forcibly sterilize a feeble-minded woman on eugenic grounds to prevent her from 
reproducing a child).  This decision was not rendered obsolete by a subsequent Supreme 
Court decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942), which invalidated a 
state law which allowed sterilization of persons determined to be habitual criminals and 
which was applied on a racially discriminatory basis.  Id. at 542 (noting that Bell did not 
involve the same equal protection violations that caused the court to reject the application 
of the habitual criminal statute in Skinner). 
 24. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 535 (2004) (Souter J., concurring) (noting that 
eugenics long has “lapsed into discredit”). 
 25. See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW & SCIENCE § 8.4 (2d ed. 2011) 
(summarizing the laws of nineteen states regarding human cloning). 
 26. See generally John A. Gibbons, Who’s Your Daddy?: A Constitutional Analysis 
of Post-Mortem Insemination, Mortem Insemination, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH. L. & 
POL’Y 187, 195-98 (1997) (arguing that there is a constitutional right to reproduce by 
using assisted reproduction, but this does not encompass the right to have a 
posthumously-conceived child declared the child of the deceased parent); see also 
Browne Lewis, Graveside Birthday Parties: The Legal Consequences of Forming 
Families Posthumously, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1159, 1159-60 (2010) (discussing the 
potential rights and interests to deceased gamete providers, their posthumous children, 
spouses and other survivors). 
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matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child.”27  This dictum seems to best reflect the values of American 
law regarding freedom of individual choice in regard to human 
reproduction.28  While there have been a number of court decisions dealing 
with posthumous reproduction,29 none of them have addressed the issue of a 
deceased person’s purported constitutional right to conceive a child 
posthumously.30 
IV. THE MILITARY, DEAD SOLDIERS, AND THEIR GAMETES 
In 2002, an Israeli soldier, Kevian Cohen, was killed by a sniper.31  His 
sperm was harvested shortly after his death.32  If his sperm were to be used 
for reproduction it would be necessary to have a surrogate carrier.33  This 
would require medical assistance for in vitro fertilization and implantation of 
any resulting embryo.  Because the hospital refused to release the sperm, it 
was necessary to obtain court approval for this procedure.  Cohen’s parents 
learned of the possibility that their son could father children posthumously 
from media reports about Advocate Irit Rosenblum’s proposal to establish a 
sperm bank for Israeli Defense Forces in 2001.  Shortly after their son’s 
death, Cohen’s parents contacted Rosenblum, seeking to use Cohen’s sperm 
so that their son could become a parent posthumously.34  Cohen was not 
 
 27. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional a 
Massachusetts statute which prohibited distribution of contraceptives to unmarried 
persons). 
 28. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(discussing Eisenstadt and noting that “our law affords constitutional protections to 
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
child rearing, and education”). 
 29. See generally Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 12 (discussing various legal 
decisions and statutes governing posthumous reproduction). 
 30. See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 
2002); Khabbas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180, 1185-86 (N.H. 2007). 
 31. Irit Rosenblum, Dead 11 Years, Soon To Be a Father, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL 
(Nov. 26, 2013. 6:01 AM), http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/dead-for-11-years-and-soon-to-
become-a-father/; see also Harriet Sherwood, Israeli Couple Seek Right to Use Dead 
Son’s Sperm, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2011, 4:16 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2011/feb/08/israeli-parents-dead-son-sperm.  Much of the information about this 
event was provided orally to the author by Irit Rosenblum, the attorney who was retained 
by the family of Kevian Cohen in two conversations and confirmed in subsequent emails. 
 32. Sherwood, supra note 32. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Rosenblum, supra note 32; see also, Dan Even, Dead Woman’s Ova Harvested 
After Court Okays Family Request, HARRETZ (Aug. 8, 2011, 2:10 AM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/dead-woman-s-ova-harvested-after-court-
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married, and the Attorney General of Israel35 initially opposed the request.36  
The Attorney General took the position that only the surviving spouse of a 
deceased person could request a court’s approval to use his sperm to 
inseminate a female carrier.37  Eventually, Rosenblum, the family’s lawyer, 
found a woman who agreed to be inseminated with the dead soldier’s 
sperm.38  In a prolonged legal dispute with the attorney general of Israel 
Rosenblum set a precedent by winning the right for a woman chosen by the 
Cohen family to raise Keivan’s child as her own by conceiving a baby girl 
with his sperm.  The woman presented evidence of the soldier’s intent and, 
after many years of litigation,39 the Court approved the woman’s petition for 
insemination.40  In 2013, the woman gave birth to Kevian Cohen’s 
biological daughter eleven years after his death.41 
In the United States, public information began to appear in the media 
regarding the cryopreservation of sperm by male service-members before 
their deployment into combat when sperm banks began advertising to 
military service-members in the early 2000’s.42  Although less has been 
written about the potential for female service-members to preserve their 
fertility by cryopreservation of eggs, there is no reason to doubt that eggs 
can also be harvested and preserved.43  Once preserved, they can later be 
 
okays-family-request-1.377495 (explaining that an Israeli court allowed parents to 
harvest the eggs of their teenage daughter after she died in an accident). 
 35. The Attorney General of Israel “serves as legal counsel for the Government and 
public authorities, directs the state prosecution and supervises the legal department that 
prepares and reviews proposed legislation.”  The Attorney General, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Spotlight/Pages/The%20Attorney 
%20General.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
 36. Rosenblum, supra note 32. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. After the litigation began, the woman was substituted as the petitioning party for 
the soldier’s parents.  Id.  The original surrogate carrier had fertility problems, and 
another woman was substituted as the petitioning party.  Id. 
 41. Rosenblum, supra note 32. 
 42. Valerie Alvord, Some Troops Freeze Sperm Before Deploying, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 26, 2003), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-01-26-bank-usat_x.htm; see 
also Valerie Alvord, Troops Start Trend with Sperm Banks, USA TODAY (Jan. 26, 
2003), http://www.usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-01-26-sperm-inside 
_x.htm. 
 43. See generally Michael J. Tucker, GEORGIA REPRODUCTION SPECIALISTS, The 
Freezing of Human Oocytes (Eggs), http://www.ivf.com /freezing.html (last visited Oct. 
5, 2014). 
80 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. 31:1 
fertilized by in vitro fertilization to create embryos, which can be 
immediately implanted or cryopreserved for future implantation.44 
The potential for posthumous reproduction using the gametes of dead 
military personnel was noted in a pioneering article published in a pamphlet 
of the United States Army by U.S. Army Major Doucettperry, a Judge 
Advocate General (“JAG”).45  Although there was no litigation involving 
military personnel and assisted reproductive technology,46 Major 
Doucettperry correctly analogized the issue to cases in which the courts 
considered the status of posthumously conceived children under state 
inheritance laws for eligibility for Social Security benefits.47  Under the 
Army’s Readiness Process Training, soldiers preparing for deployment 
should have access to legal advice on matters such as estate planning, 
medical directives, and other legal documents.48  Major Doucettperry 
suggested that this would be an opportune time to counsel the soldiers about 
posthumous reproduction, and if they wish to do so, clarify their consent and 
intent.49  Major Doucettperry stated that soldiers preparing to deploy should 
be briefed on cryopreservation as part of their Soldier Readiness Process 
Training.50  This is important since there have been reports of posthumously 
conceived children in the United States from the use of the stored sperm of 
soldiers killed in foreign combat.51  A USA TODAY report stated that there 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Major Maria Doucettperry, To be Continued: A Look at Posthumous 
Reproduction As it Relates to Today’s Military, ARMY LAW, May 2008, at 1-22. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 9-13; see Woodward v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 
2002) (on certified questions, interpreting its inheritance statute to include a 
posthumously conceived child as the deceased father’s heir under Massachusetts law).  
Cf. Khabbas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180, 1185-86 (N.H. 2007) (holding that 
a posthumously conceived child was not an heir under New Hampshire law); Finley v. 
Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Ark. 2008) (posthumously conceived child not an heir 
under Arkansas law); Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012) (deferring to the 
Social Security Administration’s interpretation that a Florida statute excluded a 
posthumously conceived child from inheritance, and thereby from Social Security 
Benefits, unless named in the deceased father’s will); see generally Jennifer Matystik, 
Posthumously Conceived Children: Why States Should Update Their Intestacy Laws After 
Astrue v. Capato, 28 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 269 (2013) (examining the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Astrue v. Capato). 
 48. Doucettperry, supra note 46, at 21. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Gregg Zoroya, Science Makes Fallen Soldier a Father, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 
2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-02-11-soldier-child-cover_x 
.htm (report of a baby boy conceived with the use of his father’s sperm and born two 
years after his soldier-father was killed in Iraq).  The same article mentions another 
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was a spike of calls to sperm banks before the deployment of soldiers at the 
start of the Iraq war.52 
V. PROPOSED LAWS ON ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 
The Uniform Parentage Act53 addresses some of these matters, but does so 
in the context of the law of parentage.  The Uniform Probate Code54 deals 
with issues relating to gratuitous transfers on death and trust issues, both as 
to assisted reproduction and surrogacy.  The American Bar Association 
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology55 is much broader 
than the uniform laws, and attempts to regulate multiple aspects of ART 
beyond parentage and probate issues.56 
Outside of assisted reproduction parentage the law requires consent to 
sexual relations for legal parenthood if a child is conceived and carried to 
term.57  However, assisted reproduction is by definition a non-sexual method 
of reproduction and the consent issues are, out of necessity, examined by a 
different set of concerns.58  When human gametes are harvested and 
cryopreserved, the issue turns on the gamete provider consenting to 
retrieval59 and/or actual transfer60 of gametes into the body of a woman with 
 
widow of a soldier killed in Iraq who became pregnant using the sperm of her deceased 
husband.  Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702, 703 (2000) (as amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 7 at 68 
(Supp. 2010). 
 54. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-120, 2-121 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. at 71 (Supp. 2010) 
(describing inheritance rights to and from children conceived posthumously by assisted 
reproduction or surrogacy arrangements). 
 55. A.B.A. MODEL ACT (approved by the A.B.A. Family Law Section in 2007 and 
the A.B.A. House of Delegates in 2008). 
 56. See, e.g., id. §§ 201-06 (informed consent to ART), 801-02 (payments to donor 
and gestational carriers). 
 57. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 149. 
 58. Id. at 149-50. 
 59. A.B.A. MODEL ACT § 102(34) (defining “retrieval” as the “procurement of eggs 
or sperm from a gamete provider”).  This is also frequently referred to as “harvesting.”  
NYU Fertility Center, About the Egg Freezing Process (2014), 
http://www.nyufertilitycenter.org/ (egg freezing/cryopreservation process).  Embryos are 
not retrieved but are procured by fertilization in vitro of harvesting egg and sperm, which 
had been retrieved.  Id. 
 60. See A.B.A. MODEL ACT §§ 102(37) (defining “transfer” as the “placement of an 
embryo or gametes into the body of a woman with the intent to achieve pregnancy and 
live birth”), 606(2) (providing that the “consent of an individual to assisted reproduction 
may be withdrawn by that individual at any time before placement of eggs, sperm, or 
embryos”). 
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the intent to conceive a child.61  This clearly differs from sexual 
reproduction, because unlike sexual in assisted reproduction, the intent to 
transfer the gamete for the purpose of producing a pregnancy is paramount. 
In contrast to assisted reproduction, to establish parenthood in sexual 
reproduction there is no need to show consent to an intent to produce a 
pregnancy. 
VI. EXPLORING THE CONSENT ISSUE    
The law of battery gave rise to the law governing informed consent to 
bodily touching.  In the context of assisted reproduction, informed consent is 
given when a person agrees to the retrieval and use of gametes taken from 
his or her body.62  The retrieval of gametes is the first step toward the 
conception of a child by posthumous reproduction.63  The retrieved gametes 
are placed in the custody of others such as physicians and clinics so that they 
can be transferred to the reproductive organ of a woman.64  Consent for 
retrieval is an important consideration, and there seems to be a general (but 
not universal) agreement that consent must have been given by the person 
from whom the gamete was retrieved.65  In accordance with the Uniform 
Parentage Act and the A.B.A. MODEL ACT, consent should be given in a 
retrievable record.66  As of 2014, express consent is generally not a statutory 
requirement in most United States jurisdictions, except in California67 and 
New Mexico.68 
 
 61. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 149. 
 62. Id. at 150. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See generally Amy Lai, A Critique of the Model Act Governing Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 24 AM. J. FAM. L. 218, 218-25 (Winter 2011) (critically 
analyzing the Model Act’s strict intent-based parenthood approach as applied to 
posthumous reproduction). 
 66. A.B.A. MODEL ACT § 102(33) (defining a “record” as “information inscribed in a 
tangible medium or stored in an electronic or other medium that is retrievable in 
perceivable form”). 
 67. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (2014) (requiring for probate purposes that the 
decedent have consented in writing to posthumous reproduction during his lifetime); see 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 4052.5(a) (2014) (providing for child support purposes that a child 
may have more than two parents).  This may have implications for parenthood of children 
conceived by ART. 
 68. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-120(F)(1), (2)(c) (2011) (New Mexico recognizes a 
child of assisted reproduction if its parent consented in a record signed before or after its 
birth, or in the absence of a record the parent was intended to be treated as a 
posthumously conceived child if the intent is established by clear and convincing 
evidence). 
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States also place different emphases on the timing of conception.  
Minnesota provides that a parent-child relationship does not exist for 
purposes of inheritance “between a child of assisted reproduction and 
another person unless the child of assisted reproduction is in gestation prior 
to the death of such person.”69  However, Minnesota does not prohibit a 
person from providing for a child conceived after his death in his or her 
will.70  Colorado recognizes a parental relationship between an individual 
and a gestational child “whose sperm or eggs were used after the 
individual’s death or incapacity under a gestational agreement . . . if the 
individual intended to be treated as the parent of the child.”71  In the absence 
of a written agreement, the intent in this type of agreement is measured by a 
test of clear and convincing evidence.72 
When a dead or incompetent person has previously consented to have his 
or her gametes harvested and cryopreserved, this does not usually mean that 
others (spouses, lovers, parents, researchers etc.) can legally retrieve them, 
fertilize them, or transfer them to produce a pregnancy without prior consent 
of the person.73  The general view is that the law should require proof of 
such consent given in a record.74  However, a court, even in a jurisdiction 
whose statute does not require a record of consent, may be able, under its 
equity powers, to allow use of the gametes by court authorization finding 
consent on the basis of other proof through clear and convincing evidence.75 
In accordance with the principles of informed consent a person should not 
have his or her gametes used to conceive a child without his or her 
knowledge or prior consent, except perhaps in extraordinary circumstances, 
such as when there is undisputed and compelling evidence of consent, but it 
is not found in a record.76  An example would be a mature minor who has 
 
 69. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2.120(10) (West 2013) (expressly noting that a parent-
child relationship does not exist between a deceased parent and a posthumously 
conceived child unless the child was “in gestation prior to the death of” the deceased 
parent). 
 70. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257 (West 2013) (statute related to children 
and legitimacy).  The Minnesota law governing wills does not expressly provide for 
posthumously conceived children but does not prevent a testator or testatrix from 
providing for them.  See generally § 524.2.501-517.  This is true in other states as well, 
but is noted here because of the express exclusion of such children in the states’ 
inheritance statute. 
 71. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-121(5) (West 2013). 
 72. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-121(5)(a)-(b). 
 73. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 149-51. 
 74. Id. at 150. 
 75. Id. at 158 n.49. 
 76. Id. at 152. 
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made his intent known orally to several disinterested persons before he 
entered the military but has never executed a written record. 
It can be argued that medical intervention by assisted reproduction to 
produce a child for a dead or incompetent person without his or her consent 
would offend basic principles of bodily integrity.  Critics of the prior consent 
requirement may argue that mandating proof of such consent leaves a 
surviving partner or a family without an opportunity to have a child that is 
genetically connected to the deceased loved one.77  However, the argument 
that the survivor(s) should be able to give a substituted consent in such cases 
seems to be weak under current uniform law proposals and under the A.B.A. 
MODEL ACT proposal.78  Allowing another person to decide if the dead or 
incompetent person will become a parent without their prior consent to the 
use of cryopreserved gametes or embryos seems beyond the pale of current 
legal and ethical thought on the subject. 
VII. VARIOUS SOLUTIONS TO THE CONSENT REQUIREMENT 
There may be other ways of thinking about the requirement of prior 
consent before assisted reproduction can be used to create a parent-child 
relationship with a posthumously conceived child.  Most courts are likely to 
hold to a strict requirement that a deceased or incompetent service-member 
has previously given prior consent in a record.79  The position of the 
American Bar Association, as reflected in the A.B.A. MODEL ACT, 
provides the best protection against one person using the gametes of a dead 
person to impose parentage on that person without his or her prior consent. 
However, some less strict proposals may be considered.  One such idea 
would be to allow an inference of consent by clear and convincing evidence 
showing an unequivocal intent to consent prior to death or incompetence to 
both the harvesting and use of his or her gametes.  A standard like this could 
be enforced by an express requirement that consent be established by clear 
and convincing evidence from whatever circumstances are relevant.  This 
idea has the merit of requiring some substantial proof of the deceased 
person’s intent, even without a written record. 
Another idea is to allow the deceased or incompetent person’s executor, 
estate administrator, or guardian to make the choice by substituted consent 
when the deceased person has not consented in a record.  This author 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. But see A.B.A. MODEL ACT § 205(1) (requiring prior written consent from the 
deceased but also allowing “the individual’s authorized fiduciary who has express 
authorization from the principal to so consent”). 
 79. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 150 n.15 (noting a potential exception to the written 
record requirement in cases involving a minor). 
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believes this idea is unacceptable because it travels too far from the 
fundamental premise that parentage by assisted reproduction should not be 
imposed on a person without his consent.  The person giving substituted 
consent may believe he or she is doing what the deceased person would have 
wanted done, but that is clearly different from what the deceased actually 
chose to do. 
Lastly, a policy could be developed by court decisions or legislation to 
allow specified surviving family members of the deceased or incompetent 
person (such as a spouse or parent) to decide on how and when to use the 
gametes even when the deceased has not provided a record of consent.  The 
problem with this procedure is that the interests of the surviving person(s) 
may not be identical, and perhaps even in conflict with the interests of the 
deceased with regard to parentage or inheritance. 
VIII. COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR POSTHUMOUS USE OF 
GAMETES 
Whichever of the possible policies is approved by legislation or applied in 
practice in regard to posthumous use of gametes, court approval of the 
choice should be required before using the gametes of a deceased person to 
actually conceive and produce a child.  While some survivors may resent 
court intrusion in what may be perceived as a private family decision, the 
reality is that an independent, neutral court decision may be the best 
insurance against misuse of the gametes of a dead incompetent person. 
IX. SURVIVING SPOUSE SEEKING TO HARVEST DEAD SPOUSE’S GAMETES 
Note: In Sections IX and X of this article the author has borrowed from 
some ideas and analysis which he previously expressed in his article titled 
Genetically Related Children: Harvesting Gametes from Deceased or 
Incompetent Persons, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW 147 (2011), in order 
to apply those ideas and analysis to the subject matter of this article. 
A surviving spouse80 sometimes seeks to have medical personnel retrieve 
the sperm or eggs of a recently deceased spouse.81  There are no known 
 
 80. A.B.A. MODEL ACT § 102(21) (defining legal spouse as “an individual married to 
another, or who has a legal relationship to another that this state accords rights and 
responsibilities equal to, or substantially equivalent to, those of marriage”).  This 
definition allows persons living in a state which recognizes registered domestic 
partnerships or civil unions to be treated as a legal spouse for purposes of ART even if 
not technically married.  As more states recognize various legal types of personal 
intimate family relationships (domestic partnerships, civil unions, etc.), the definition of 
“spouse” becomes increasingly important in resolving the question of who is a surviving 
partner as the functional equivalent of a married person. 
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reports of such requests arising in the military context, and in the case of a 
combat death, it is unlikely to arise because access to the body by the 
surviving spouse within hours of death cannot usually occur.82  However, 
the situation can arise in the case of an accidental death on a domestic base 
or in a training context.83  Can this request be allowed when the deceased 
spouse cannot consent to the removal of his sperm or her eggs?  In the 
United States, it is doubtful that the medical staff would consent to this 
without either a court order or at least a formal opinion by a hospital counsel 
authorizing the harvesting of a dead or incompetent soldier’s gametes.84 
Hospital or clinic counsel may be reluctant to approve removal of gametes 
from a dead person unless authorized by a judicial order.85 
Malpractice concerns often dictate caution in making choices.  While this 
is understandable, the narrow window of opportunity to harvest the sperm 
from a dead body requires a prompt decision by a judge.  Will a judge allow 
the retrieval without credible evidence that the spouse expressly consented 
to this before his or her death or incompetence?  No doubt judges may 
answer this question differently, since it essentially involves the substituted 
judgment of the court for that of the deceased person in the absence of 
strong evidence of intent.  A survivor may seek judicial approval to have 
gametes harvested in case of an accident or other unexpected death or injury 
resulting in incompetence.86  However, under the A.B.A. MODEL ACT, in 
the absence of proof of prior consent of the now deceased or incompetent 
person to having a child, a judicial order of harvesting, or even more 
unlikely placement of the gametes, may not be forthcoming.87 
 
 81. Susan Crockin, Legally Speaking, ASRM NEWS, Sept. 30, 2009 (approving the 
request after the dead man’s fiancée told the judge that her fiancé told her he wanted to 
have another child with her just a day before he died); see Maggie Gallagher, New York 
Forum About the Sperm The Ultimate Deadbeat Dads, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 1995, at A28 
(sperm taken from body of deceased husband and cryopreserved at request of his widow); 
Ike Flores, Newlywed Dies in Crash, but Hopes for Children Live in Extracted Sperm 
Florida: A Rare Surgical Procedure Performed After Groom’s Death Could Allow 
Widow to Become Pregnant. But Chances of Success are Slim, Doctors Warn, L.A. 
TIMES, July 3, 1994, at A10 (sperm removed from dead body of newlywed husband for 
possible future use of widow). 
 82. Doucettperry, supra note 46, at 2. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 157. 
 85. Bethany Spielman, Pushing the Dead into the Next Reproductive Frontier: Post 
Mortem Gamete Retrieval Under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 37 J. OF L. MED. & 
ETHICS 331, 332 (2009). 
 86. Id. 
 87. A.B.A. MODEL ACT § 205 (prohibiting collection of gametes from dead or 
incompetent persons unless the individual has previously consented in a record). 
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The difference between “harvesting” gametes and the “placement” of 
gametes after they have been retrieved is an important one.88  For example, a 
woman’s request for retrieval of her husband’s sperm from his dead body 
will have to be acted on promptly.89  There is a narrow window of time in 
which the sperm will remain vital.90  If not retrieved within this narrow 
window of time (around 30 hours of death) the sperm will not be viable.91 
Once this window has closed posthumous reproduction becomes impossible.  
However, there will no doubt be emergency situations in which consent will 
be alleged by a survivor but not proven by production of a consent record.92 
It is for this reason that the A.B.A. MODEL ACT contains the following 
exception to the requirement that gametes not be retrieved from a dead body 
unless he or she gave his or her consent prior to their death in a record: 
In the event of an emergency where the required consent is alleged but 
unavailable and where, in the opinion of the treating physician, loss of 
viability would occur as a result of delay, and where there is a genuine 
question as to the existence of consent in a record, an exception is 
permissible.93 
When a surviving spouse or partner asserts that her husband or partner had 
previously consented to harvesting of his sperm in case of his death, the 
physician will have to make the decision to retrieve or not retrieve the 
sperm.94  However, in the absence of a record, such as that contemplated by 
Section 205 of the A.B.A. MODEL ACT, counsel might recommend 
seeking an emergency ruling from a court authorizing the harvesting of the 
gametes even in the absence of a record consent.95 
 
 88. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 157. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. A.B.A. MODEL ACT § 205(2); Kindregan, supra note 3, at 157; see also Charles 
P. Kindregan, Jr., Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir from the Freezer, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 433, 440 (2009) (advocating the enactment of more uniform legislation to clarify 
status of posthumously conceived children); Susan Kerr, Post-Mortem Sperm 
Procurement: Is it Legal?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 39, 68 (1999) (advocating that 
legal survivors be allowed to remove sperm from dead body); see David M. Greer, M.D. 
et al., Case Number 21-2010: A Request for Retrieval of Oocytes from a 36 Year Old 
Woman with Anoxic Brain Injury, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED., 276, 282 (2010) (including 
analysis of the A.B.A. MODEL ACT provisions). 
 94. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 158. 
 95. Id. at 150, 158 n.49 (noting that a party could seek an equitable ruling if allowed 
by local procedure); A.B.A. MODEL ACT § 205(2) (depending on local procedure, a ruling 
could be sought under a statute which specifically provides for it, or an action in equity or 
declaratory judgment). 
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X. GOOD PRACTICE REGARDING DISPOSITION OF SPERM BY DEPLOYED 
SOLDIERS 
Some male military personnel who are assigned to duty in a combat zone 
may consider storing their sperm before deployment.96  The number of 
soldiers who do so may initially be relatively small,97 but this will likely 
grow as knowledge of this option becomes better known.  Service-members 
are in an especially good position to consider whether to cryopreserve 
gametes prior to deployment because they are encouraged to consult with 
counsel regarding their legal affairs.98  This can include discussion of the 
preservation of their gametes in case of a serious wound which could harm 
their potential for having genetically-related children, or even to allow a 
surviving spouse or designated partner to use the sperm for the same purpose 
in case of death in combat.  This turns on the intent of the service-member or 
his or her partner.  Thus, before deployment and the sperm storage, the 
service-member and his or her spouse or other persons affected by the 
consent document should consult counsel and make a record of their intent 
with regard to any restrictions.99 
The record should make clear the circumstances under which the 
survivor(s) will have access to the sperm or eggs and whether access is 
limited only to the death of the soldier or includes access in case of his or 
her incompetence.100  The consent document should also make clear any 
time limitations involved.  For example, the record may require that the 
survivor use the sperm within a certain number of years, or be destroyed 
after a period of time.101  The consent document may restrict the use of the 
sperm if the surviving spouse or partner remarries or enters a new intimate 
relationship.102  In this case, the record should clearly spell out the soldier’s 
intent, and should do so in clear and unequivocal language; to be safe the 
record should unambiguously express the soldier’s intent to become a parent 
through posthumous reproduction.103 
 
 96. See generally Doucettperry, supra note 46 (noting issues created by sperm 
storage before combat deployment and relatives of injured or dead soldiers requesting 
access to their sperm); see also Alvord, Some Troops Freeze Sperm Before Deploying, 
supra note 43. 
 97. One report in USA Today estimated that, as of 2008, about 100 troops have 
deposited sperm in the three largest national sperm banks.  Zoroya, supra note 52. 
 98. Doucettperry, supra note 46, at 21. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 160. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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The record itself can take many forms.  It can be a contract between the 
soldier and his wife or partner.  It could also be a deed of gift to the spouse 
partner, or a provision in a will, conveying the cryopreserved sperm.  It 
could also, or in addition, be a document authorizing a sperm bank to 
preserve his sperm and to allow the surviving spouse or partner to access the 
cryopreserved gamete.  The record can even be a provision in a testamentary 
instrument.104  The best practice would be to use all of these records to 
clearly establish consent.  The storage facility should be expressly willing to 
abide by the wishes of the couple. 
An early decision on posthumous reproduction was a California Court of 
Appeals decision in which the question was raised whether a court would 
recognize a man’s ability to transfer his sperm to his girlfriend by deed and 
will for her use after his death.  The man stored his sperm, left instructions 
with the sperm bank to give his girlfriend access to the cryopreserved sperm, 
and executed a will gifting it to her before he killed himself.105  There, the 
court reasoned that the sperm was properly considered part of the estate and 
the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that the deceased could not 
gift away the sperm in his will.106 
If a soldier is not married to the woman he designates as the person 
entitled to the sperm, the record of consent should make clear that the 
transfer is his intent notwithstanding that the woman is not his spouse.  If the 
record is contested (for example by the soldier’s legal spouse or family 
member) in court, the question may be raised whether it is contrary to public 
policy for a judge to approve the transfer of sperm to a person who is not a 
spouse.107  Many children are born out of marriage today, but someone may 
ask: “should the law condone it by allowing an unmarried woman access to 
sperm to conceive a child posthumously?”108  I think it is unlikely that a 
court today would focus on whether or not the intended parents are married 
since the right of unmarried persons to have a child is not likely to be 
successfully contested in modern America.109  This is reflected in the A.B.A. 
MODEL ACT, which, while recognizing the interests of legal spouses in 
 
 104. Id. at 161. 
 105. Hecht v. Sup. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (involving a 
challenge to the girlfriend’s access to the stored sperm of her deceased boyfriend by the 
man’s prior-born children). 
 106. Id. at 283-84. 
 107. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 161. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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regard to parentage,110 does not place any limitation on the use of assisted 
reproduction by unmarried persons.111 
XI. THE STATUS OF THE POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILD 
The issues discussed above directly raise questions regarding the legal 
status of children of posthumous conception, i.e., the parenthood of a man or 
woman whose child is conceived after that person’s death.  The law has long 
recognized that for purposes of inheritance, a child conceived naturally 
before the father’s death, but born after the father’s death, is the father’s 
legal child.112  This situation is different from the problem of a child born 
after a father’s death because it involves the intentional potential post-
mortem conception of a child.  Posthumous conception today is entitled to 
recognition under the Uniform Probate Code which recognizes that an 
individual can be the legal parent of a gestational child conceived after his or 
her death if the child is in utero no later than 36 months after the parent’s 
death or is born no later than 45 months after the parent’s death.113 
In the United States, the definition of who is considered the child of a 
deceased person has historically been determined by state law.114  The best 
analogy is found in Social Security law, where the determination of the 
benefits of a surviving child of a Social Security beneficiary is determined 
by the law of the state.115  In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a 
posthumously conceived child of a deceased Social Security beneficiary who 
was domiciled in Florida was not his legal heir since a Florida statute 
restricted recognition of posthumous conception to those who were named in 
the parent’s will.116  This result also exists in other state statutes, although if 
 
 110. See A.B.A. MODEL ACT § 605(1)-(2), for limitations on the right of the legal 
spouse to dispute parentage of a child born to his wife by assisted reproduction; see also 
id. § 604(1) (stating the right of an “individual” to use ART to become a parent is clearly 
recognized by the person’s consent in a record). 
 111. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 161-62. 
 112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
2.1(d) (1999). 
 113. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-120(k) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. at 59 (Supp. 2010). 
 114. Kindregan, supra note 3, at 168. 
 115. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012) (“In determining whether an applicant is 
the child or parent of a fully or currently insured individual . . . the Commissioner of 
Social Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of 
intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is 
domiciled.”). 
 116. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012) (holding that children conceived 
through in vitro fertilization after Florida-domiciled wage earner’s death were not entitled 
to survivor child’s insurance under the Social Security Act because children did not 
qualify for inheritance under Florida’s intestacy law). 
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the state inheritance statute recognized the posthumous reproduction as 
producing an heir, the Social Security law could provide benefits.117 
The critical question then relates to the military survivor benefits of the 
deceased service-member: under the law of his or her state, is the 
posthumously conceived child legally the child of the deceased service-
member?  However, it is also possible that a court would look to statutory 
definitions of children used in other military benefits law when confronted 
with the question of whether a posthumous child conceived using the 
gametes of a dead service-member is that service-member’s child.  For 
example, the military pension law defines a dependent as: 
[a] child who (i) has not attained the age of 21, (ii) has not attained 
the age of 23, is enrolled in a full-time course of study at an 
institution of higher learning approved by the administering 
Secretary and is, or was at the time of the member’s or former 
member’s death, in fact dependent on the member or former 
member’s for over one-half of the child’s support, or (iii) is 
incapable of self-support . . .118 
A court might also look to the definition of an “unmarried legitimate 
child” to describe the child of a member or former member of the 
military,119 which in turn may depend on the status of the child under state 
law.120 
It will be important to resolve this question when the posthumously 
conceived child of a deceased soldier applies for benefits.  The Veteran’s 
Administration (VA) benefits program is complex and includes benefits for 
survivors of military service members who die or become incapacitated 
while on active duty.121  The definition of “child” is inconsistent among the 
various relevant statutes.122  Under the Dependency and Indemnity 
Compensation Act (DIC), a “child” includes a person who is unmarried and 
under the age of 18 or is under the age of 23 and pursuing a course of 
instruction at an approved educational institution) and (i) is legitimate, (ii) is 
legally adopted, (iii) is illegitimate and has been acknowledged in a signed 
writing by the father, or (iv) had paternity for purposes of child support 
 
 117. See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002) 
(holding that under limited circumstances, posthumously conceived children may enjoy 
the inheritance rights of “issue” under Massachusetts intestacy law). 
 118. 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)(D)(i)-(iii) (2012). 
 119. 10 U.S.C. § 1072(6)(A); see also 10 U.S.C. § 1447(11)(A) (defining “dependent 
child” under the Military Survivor Benefit Plan). 
 120. Doucettperry, supra note 46, at 19-20. 
 121. Id. at 14. 
 122. Id. at 20. 
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determined judicially determined before the father’s death.123  However, the 
same statute also provides that the child may be determined to be the child 
of the veteran if the veteran is “otherwise shown by evidence satisfactory to 
the Secretary to be the father of such child.”124  As to the medical and dental 
care of a dependent child of the soldier who died on active duty,125 at the 
time of this article, there is no controlling court decision on the status of the 
posthumously conceived child under laws dealing with military benefits.126 
While it is not absolutely certain, it seems more likely than not that this 
question will be resolved in a way analogous to the determination of a 
posthumous child’s status as in the Social Security cases.  This uncertainty 
might cause some to doubt the financial wisdom of conceiving children with 
the sperm of dead service-members, but for many the desire of a surviving 
spouse or partner for a genetic connection to the deceased soldier may still 
be sufficient grounds to approve the practice. 
XI. POST INJURY FERTILITY TREATMENT FOR THE INJURED SOLDIER 
In recent years, many men and women have been called to military duty 
from their Reserve and National Guard status.127  These service-members 
have been placed on active duty and the death and injury rate has 
substantially increased among members stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan.128 
While the prior commitment of the military to assignment in places such as 
Afghanistan may be substantially winding down, it is inevitable that future 
conflicts will again expose the American military service members to the 
various dangers of combat.129  The nature of combat and even assignments 
to meet with civilians exposes these civilians and soldiers to the risk of 
pressure-plate improvised explosive devices, death, or serious injury.130 
 
 123. 38 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (2012). 
 124. Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 1313 (Veterans Dependency and Indemnity 
Compensation for Service-Connected Death) (providing for financial compensation for 
the children of soldiers when the parent is killed in a connected death and there is no 
surviving spouse entitled to the compensation). 
 125. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 1076 (2012) (defining the access of dependents of 
soldiers who died on duty to medical and dental care). 
 126. Doucettperry, supra note 46, at 1-2. 
 127. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, DEPLOYMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE 
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 7 (Sept. 2007), 
available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA478163.pdf. 
 128. Doucettperry, supra note 46, at 1 n.5. 
 129. Id. at 1. 
 130. William R. Levesque, IED’s Continue to Kill and Maim U.S. Troops Despite 
Multibillion Dollar Effort, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, 
http://www.tampabay.com/ news/military/war/ieds-continue-to-kill-and-maim-us-troops-
despite-multibillion-dollar-effort/1253728. 
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Even if death does not result, loss of reproductive capacity can occur due 
to injury.131 Some service-members may be issued ballistic underwear, 
which can help reduce the risk of injury to the reproductive organs.132  This 
should be uniform policy for the Department of Defense: to provide the best 
possible protection against such injuries.  Most service-members, male and 
female, are still in their most fertile years,133 and if their reproductive 
capacity is injured or compromised, they may not be able to start or continue 
the development of their families after their deployment ends.  At the very 
least, it should be military policy to advise service-members to take steps to 
protect their reproductive potential by wearing the best available protective 
clothing and equipment.  This would not conflict with promotion of pre-
deployment cryopreservation of gametes, but would supplement a service-
member’s protection of a vital human capacity to reproduce while they are 
serving their country.134 
What happens when a service-member has sustained injuries to his or her 
reproductive system?  Some military services treat infertility problems 
caused by injury while service-members remain in the military.  For 
example, the Army provides infertility services for injured soldiers, such as 
in vitro fertilization.135  However, service-members who are injured to the 
point that they are not able to remain in the service will undergo transfer to 
the VA Services.136  After separation from the military, the former service-
member may only have access to the limited services provided by the VA 
department,137 unless he or she has access to comprehensive private or other 
medical services.  While the VA program provides some infertility services 
such as intrauterine insemination, the important service of in vitro 
 
 131. Doucettperry, supra note 46, at 2. 
 132. Sgt. 1st Class Raymond Piper, Deploying Soldiers to receive ballistic briefs, U.S. 
ARMY (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.army.mil/article/66916/. 
 133. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 2012 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community at 
36 available at http://www.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2012 
_Demographics_Report.pdf (noting that 65.7% of active duty service-members are 30 or 
younger, with that number rising to 80.4% when considering members 35 and younger). 
 134. The author was first made aware of the potential for military persons to wear 
protective clothing by Stephen J. Patten, an LL.M. candidate at Suffolk University Law 
School.  Mr. Patten served as a Captain and Judge Advocate General in the United States 
Army during two tours in Afghanistan with 82nd Airborne Division, during which he was 
awarded the Bronze Star. 
 135. Maria Gallegos, Double amputee gets another chance of starting family, U.S. 
ARMY (Apr. 24, 2013), www.army.mil.article/101764; see generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
ARMY, DEP’T OF DEF. INST. 1300.24, RECOVERY COORDINATION PROGRAM (Dec. 1, 2009). 
 136. Leslie C. Rogall, An Attorney’s Guide to Veterans’ Rights and Benefits, GPSOLO 
MAG. 22 (Jan.-Feb. 2005), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications 
/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_index/anattyguide.html. 
 137. Id. 
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fertilization (which could assist some wounded former soldiers to have 
children) is not available from the VA.138  While legislation has been 
introduced into Congress to extend infertility services available to active-
duty personnel for injured veterans,139 it has not yet gained majority support 
in Congress.  These injured men and women, upon separation from the 
military, have to depend on private health insurance to provide for some 
fertility treatments or even ART services.140  Such ART services are not 
mandated in most state statutes governing health care insurance.141  When 
the damage to the fertility system has been caused by injuries incurred while 
serving their country in the military, this seems an arbitrary method of 
enabling a veteran to start or continue a family after their service. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
Since combat presents such a substantial risk that a healthy young person 
may be exposed to high risk of death or serious injury, the analysis of 
posthumous reproduction can perhaps be most clearly discussed in the 
context of the military.  This context also presents the potential for advising 
such persons of the importance of planning to preserve their fertility through 
use of cryopreservation before their deployment and of clearly setting out 
any requirements for others to have access to use their gametes in the case of 
their death or incompetence.  Of course, the same situation can arise in a 
non-military context where a death or injury occurs. 
 
 138. 38 C.F.R. § 17:38 (c)(2) (2011). 
 139. See generally The Women Veterans and Other Health Care Improvements Act of 
2013, S.131, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 958, 113th Cong. (2013). In addition to providing 
infertility services available to active duty soldiers, the proposed Acts would require the 
VA to provide infertility treatment and services to severely injured servicepersons and 
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Posthumous reproduction by military personnel raises many unanswered 
questions.  This article has pinpointed some of these issues, and made some 
suggestions as to how the law can deal with them in a way that accords both 
with policy in an all-volunteer military, and their possible application of 
civilian law models.  Hopefully, this article further helps the discussion of 
these issues by the various stakeholders.  Even in the absence of statutory 
clarification of the issues, it is the author’s hope that military practice and 
policy may clarify some of the issues associated with posthumous 
conception in the coming years. 
 
